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GOTTFRIED v. FCC:
THE PUBLIC INTEREST STANDARD AND BROADCASTER
RESPONSIBILITY TO THE HEARING-IMPAIRED
Under the Communications Act of 1934,' the Federal Com-
munications Commission (FCC or Commission) may issue or renew
broadcast licenses only to serve the public interest.2  The Com-
mission's explication of the public interest requirement has estab-
lished significant standards that broadcasters must meet to receive
or renew a license.3 Now familiar aspects of broadcaster respon-
sibility derived from the public interest standard include the per-
sonal attack rule,4 the fairness doctrine,5 and the prime-time access
rule."
In Gottfried v. FCC,7 the District of Columbia Circuit Court
of Appeals held that the public interest requirement now includes
serving the needs of the nation's deaf and hearing-impaired popu-
lation. The court required the Commission to consider Los Angeles
public television station KCET's efforts to meet the programming
needs of the deaf and hearing-impaired as part of the station's
license-renewal proceedings.8
'Chapter 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609
(1976)).
247 U.S.C. §§ 307(a); 307(d) (renewal); 309(a) (1976).
3 See Note, The Changing Face of Broadcaster Responsibility Under the Public
Interest Standard, 10 Loy. U. Cr. LJ. 115 (1978).
4 See id. The personal attack rule requires that when an attack on the honesty,
integrity, character, or similar personal quality of an individual or group is made
during a presentation on a "controversial issue of public importance," the individual
or group attacked be notified and given an opportunity to respond. 47 C.F.R.
§ 73.1920 (1980).
5 See Note, supra note 3, at 118. The fairness doctrine is established by
47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1976), and encompasses the presentation of public issues and
corresponding opposing viewpoints. See The Handling of Public- Issues Under the
Fairness Doctrine and the Public Interest Standards of the Communications. Act,
48 F.C.C.2d 1, 2-3 (1974). The personal attack rule, supra note 4, may be
viewed as an outgrowth of the more comprehensive fairness doctrine.
6 See Note, supra note 3, at 130. To ensure that locally significant program-
ming is broadcast during the heaviest viewing time, the prime-time access rule
limits network programming in the 50 largest television markets to three of the
four daily prime-time hours. 47 C.F.R. § 73.658(k) (1980).
In addition, the FCC formulated the family-viewing-hour concept because of its
concern about the possible detrimental effects of violent and sexually-oriented mate-
rial on children. See Report on the Broadcast of Violent, Indecent, & Obscene
Material, 51 F.C.C.2d 418 (1975). The National Association of Broadcasters issued
guidelines under which the first hour of prime-time network programming and the
preceding hour would be reserved for programming appropriate for the family.
Id. 422.
7655 F.2d 297 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 998 (1982).
8The court did not impose this requirement in license renewal determinations
for commercial stations. Id. 312-16. Chief Judge McGowan dissented from that
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The major importance of the court's holding in Gottfried is
its potential influence on judicial review of administrative agency
determinations. Prior to Gottfried, courts had accorded the FCC
considerable deference in defining the meaning of Congress's com-
mand to serve the public interest. In imposing the requirement
to evaluate the needs and problems of the nation's hearing-impaired,
the court took the definitional function into its own hands, ad-
monishing the Commission to "act realistically to require, in the
public interest, that the benefits of television be made available to
the hard of hearing now." 9
Gottfried merits attention both because of the affirmative obli-
gations to the hearing-impaired the court created and because of
the way the court created those obligations. It is important to note
that the court-not the FCC, which is charged with interpreting
the statute and defining the public interest in the first instance-
expanded the agency's definition by incorporating a perceived
national policy of nondiscrimination against the handicapped into
"the public interest." The court found this policy of nondiscrimi-
nation in section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.10
The court's holding has two important components. First, it
suggests that in reviewing decisions of administrative agencies
charged by Congress with the- duty of upholding the public interest,
courts may identify and incorporate perceived national policies into
the public interest. Second, it implies that federal agencies may
be required by courts to take account of matters of national con-
cern which are within the jurisdiction of other agencies. In view
of the Supreme Court's recent decision in FCC v. WNCN Listeners
Guild, which emphasized agency discretion in determining the
public interest, the court of appeals' intervention in Gottfried is
difficult to- justify.
holding, but the Supreme Court declined to review it. Gottfried v. FCC, 102
S. Ct. 1004 (1982) (denial of certiorari).
9 655 F.2d at 301 (emphasis added).
10 "No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United States . . .
shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be, excluded from the participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be subiected to discrimination under any program or
activity receivizig Federal financial assistance." Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 504, 87
Stat. 394 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976)).
. The Gottfried court made substantial use of section 504. Beyond exploring
its connection with the public interest standard, this Comment will not discuss that
section. For detailed examinations of section 504 and its implications, see
Schoenfeld, Civil.Rights for the Handicapped Under the Constitution and Section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 49 J.- CIN. L. REv. 580 (1980); Note, Administrative
Action to End Discriminati6n Based on Handicap: UEW's Section 504 Regulation,
16 HAnv. J. 6N LEdis. 59 (1979).
1"450 U.S. 582 (1981).
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Also of importance is the Gottfried court's failure .to make.
service to the hearing-impaired a factor in license renewal deter-
minations for commercial stations.. Ironically, public broadcasters
as a group have taken the lead in providing television service
to the hearing-impaired. Creation of a "double" public interest
standard for license renewals discriminates against public broad-
casters, who have acted independently to reach the hearing-impaired.
Yet commercial broadcasters, who would seem to require more
prodding in this area, are free to carry on as before.
Gottfried reached this peculiar result by looking to the Re-
habilitation Act to make its determination of the public interest.
The court's decision suggests that its uase of a "national policy" is
limited to that policy's strict statutory basis. The court therefore
concluded that although section 504 of the Act articulates a general
national policy on discrimination against the handicapped, it is
enforceable only against recipients of federal funds.
Such a reading is unsatisfactory because the FCC is not bound
by the specifics of section 504; 12 its discretion is far broader because
of its public interest mandate. Thus, the court's limitation of
its holding to noncommercial broadcasters is difficult to justify in
light of its concern about extending the benefits of television to
the deaf.'3
Part I of this Comment sets forth the facts and holding of
Gottfried. Part II discusses the relevant statutory provisions,
analyzes the public interest standard, and relates the FCC's prior
involvement in providing service to the hearing-impaired. That
part then assesses the appropriate role of court and agency in the
administrative process when statutory interpretation is involved,
and examines the Gottfried decision in light of the principles and
policies of administrative law. Finally, Part-III criticizes the Gott-
12 Because the FCC may adopt regulations in the public interest, it is free to
develop its own interpretations of policies expressed in other laws. Thus, the
Commission has enacted equal employment opportunity requirements for its licenseesdifferent from the requirements promulgated by the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission. See infra notes 73-74 and accompanying text; see also Nondiscrimi-
nation in the Employment Policies and Practices of Broadcast Licensees, 60 F.C.C.2d226 (1976); Petition for Rulemaling to Require Broadcast Licensees to Show
Nondiscrimination in Their Employment Practices, 13 F.C.C.2d 766 (1968); 47
C.F.R. § 73.2080 (1980).
"3 It should be noted that the court did not consider the creation of different
duties under the public interest standard for commercial and noncommercial broad-
casters to be the conclusion of the matter. The court stated that the Commission
could more appropriately deal with the problem of commercial broadcasters' respon-
sibility to extend service to the hearing-impaired free from judicial interference.
655 F.2d at 312-16. But the court warned that "should the Commission fail to
fulfU its obligations to the nation's hearing-impaired minority . . . judicial action
might become appropriate .... Id. 316.
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fried court's distinction between the duties of commercial and
noncommercial broadcasters in light of the court's admonition that
broadcasters must meet the needs of the hearing-impaired.
I. THE DECISION
The Federal Communications Commission issues television
broadcast licenses for five-year terms after determining that granting
a license would serve the public interest.14 A station may apply
for renewal of its license for additional five-year terms, with the
Commission again guided by the public interest standard.15
After an application is filed, "[a]ny party in interest" may file a
"petition to deny" the application with the FCC.16
In 1977 seven commercial and one noncommercial Los Angeles
television stations filed license renewal applications with the FCC.'
7
Sue Gottfried, a deaf resident of the Los Angeles area, filed peti-
tions to deny each of the eight applications.' 8 The petitions
alleged first that the stations, in violation of the requirements im-
posed by the public interest standard, had failed to address the
problems of the hearing-impaired, and second, that the stations
discriminated against the hearing-impaired in violation of section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.19 The petition to deny
public television station KCET's application also charged that it
"had shown indifference to the needs of the deaf by failing to
broadcast, through most of its license term, a captioned version
of the ABC Evening News that was made available to it by the
Public Broadcasting Service." 20
The Commission rejected Mrs. Gottfried's "petitions to deny."
It held that because the FCC does not require broadcasters either
1447 U.S.C. §307(d) (1976).
Is Id.
1647 U.S.C. § 309(d)(1) (1976); 47 C.F.R. § 7 3.3 584(a) (1980).
17 License Renewal Applications of Certain Television Stations Licensed for
and Serving Los Angeles, California, 69 F.C.C.2d 451 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
Renewal Applications], reconsideration denied, 72 F.C.C.2d 273 (1979) [hereinafter
cited as Reconsideration].
The commercial stations were KABC-TV, KCOP-TV, KHO-TV, KNBC-TV,
KNXT-TV, KTLA-TV, and KTTY-TV. The noncommercial station was KCET-TV.
Gottfried, 655 F.2d at 300 n.1.
38 Gottfried, 655 F.2d at 304. Mrs. Gottfried also flied her petition on behalf
of the Greater Los Angeles Council on Deafness, Inc. (GLAD) and numerous
other organizations. The FCC recognized Mrs. Gottfried as the only petitioner who
established standing. Renewal Applications, supra note 17, at 453. But see Gott-
fried, 655 F.2d at 304 n.32 (GLAD's standing implicitly recognized on recon-
sideration).
1 655 F.2d at 304.
20 Id. (footnote omitted).
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to determine what portion of the population is hearing-impaired
or to make programming accessible -to the hearing-impaired
through captioning or other techniques, the petitions failed to
allege a violation of Commission regulations or guidelines.
21
Thus, the petitions failed to meet the statutory standard of raising
substantial or material questions whether the renewal grant would
serve the public interest.
22
After the Commission denied reconsideration of the ruling,
Mrs. Gottfried appealed to the Court of Appeals for..the District
of Columbia Circuit.23  The court concluded that section 504 ap.-
plied to noncommercial television stations, imposing upon those
stations an affirmative obligation to consult with and provide
services for the hearing-impaired.
24
The court used a national policy of nondiscrimination against
the hearing-impaired, which it perceived to be embodied in section
504, to expand the public interest standard of the Communications
Act. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether
the court of appeals had the power to override the FCC's inter-
pretation of the public interest standard or to require the Com-
mission to implement a national policy that is neither directly
applicable to, nor enforced by, the agency.
25
II. THE PUBLIC INTEREST
A. The Legislative Mandate
In passing the Communications Act 20 Congress incorporated
the public interest requirement from the Act's predecessor, the
21 Renewal Applications, supra note 17, at 455, 458.
22 Renewal Applications, supra note 17, at 459' The statute requires that peti-
tions contain specific allegations of fact showing that a grant of the application
would be prima facie inconsistent with the public interest standard. 47 U.S.C.
§ 309(d) (1) (1976). If a substantial and material question of fact is presented,
the Commission must designate the application for hearing. Id. § 309(d) (2).
23The Act establishes the review procedure. Id. § 402(b) (6).
24Gottfried v. FCC, 655 F.2d 297 (D.C. Cir..1981), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct.
998 (1982).
25 See 50 U.S.L.W. 3454 (U.S. filed Oct. 27, 1981) (No. 81-799); id. 3259
(U.S. filed Sept. 14, 1981) (No. 81-298) (questions presented by petitions for
certiorari). The President delegated responsibility for implementing § 504 to the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (now the Department of Education)
in Exec. Order No. 11,914, 41 Fed. Reg. 17,871 (1976). See Gottfried, 655 F.2d
at 303 n.22.
2647 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976).
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Radio Act of 1927.27 The standard was viewed as a flexible check
on any excesses of broadcasting licensees.
Despite both the importance and potential breadth of the
standard, Congress has never defined "public interest, convenience,
and necessity." Instead, the public interest standard has been "a
supple instrument for the exercise of discretion by the expert
body which Congress has charged to carry out its legislative
policy." 28 Without specific congressional guidance, the Commis-
sion has used this delegation of authority to etch out a rough idea
of the standard's content.
B. The FCC and the Hearing-Impaired
1. Ascertaining the Public Interest: Requirements for Licensees
The Commission has held that a major part of a station's
public interest duty is the active discovery of community problems.
The Commission thus requires broadcasters to consult with mem-
bers of the viewing public and with community leaders in meeting
their responsibility to create programming responsive to those prob-
lems.29  In 1971, the Commission issued a Primer on Ascertain-
ment of Community Problems by Broadcast Applicants (Primer),30
which codified broadcaster responsibilities and set out the FCC's
expectations in question-and-answer form.
27The Radio Act of 1927, Pub. L. No. 69-632, § 11, 44 Stat. 1162 (1927)
(repealed 1934) provided:
If upon examination of any application for a station license or for
the renewal or modification of a station license the licensing authority
shall determine that public interest, convenience, or necessity would be
served by the granting thereof, it shall authorize the issuance, renewal, or
modification thereof in accordance with said finding.
Other statutes incorporate this standard. For example, the Interstate Com-
merce Act, addressing the Interstate Commerce Commission's role in evaluating
proposed consolidations of railroads or of a motor carrier and a railroad, states that
the Commission may approve the merger "when it finds the transaction is consistent
with the public interest." 49 U.S.C.A. § 11344(e) (West Supp. 1982). The
Commission may approve a motor carrier-railroad consolidation "only if it finds that
the transaction is consistent with the public interest, will enable the rail carrier to
use motor carrier transportation to public advantage in its operations, and will not
unreasonably restrain competition." Interstate Commerce Act. Id.
28 FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 138 (1940).
2 9 "'[T]he principal ingredient of the licensee's obligation to operate [its]
station in the public interest is the diligent, positive and continuing effort . . . to
discover and fulfill the tastes, needs and desires of his service area, for broadcast
service."' Ascertainment of Community Problems by Broadcast Applicants, 53
F.C.C.2d 3 (1975) (quoting Report and Statement of Policy Re: Commission En
Banc Programming Inquiry, 25 Fed. Reg. 7291, 20 1An. REG. (P & F) 71901
(1960)).
3027 F.C.C.2d 650 (1971). See generally Comment, FCC Broadcast Stand-
ards for Ascertaining Community Needs, 5 FoRann URaB. L.J. 55 (1976).
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As part of the ascertainment process,, the. Primer obligated
broadcasters to identify "significant groups" by means of a com-
positional survey which covered "the minority, racial or ethnic
breakdown of the community, its economic activities, govern-
mental activities, public service organizations, and any other fac-
tors or activities that make the particular community distinctive." 31
In response to criticism of this demographic breakdown require-
ment, the Commission replaced it with a community leader
checklist requirement for renewal applicants. The. checklist
covered "19 typical institutions and elements normally present in
a community." Interviews with leaders in each of the areas estab7
lished "a prima facie case of compliance with the Commission's
ascertainment guidelines." 32
Formal ascertainment requirements originally applied only
to commercial broadcasters, but the Commission extended these
requirements (with some modifications) to noncommercial broad-
casters by rulemaking.33 Although ascertainment requirements
still apply with full force to commercial television broadcasters,
the Commission, citing bureaucratic interference and cost, recently
ended primer guidelines for commercial radio stations 34 and has
proposed similar treatment for all noncommercial broadcasters.
35
Ascertainment requirements merely mandate that broad-
casters reach their communities; they say nothing about how broad-
casters should respond to the problems they discover. Because
there are only a limited number of frequencies on which problems
31 Primer, 27 F.C.C.2d at 683 (Answer 9).
32 Ascertainment of Community Problems by Broadcast Applicants, 53 F.C.C.2d
at 7. The Commission issued a new Commercial Primer in 1976, eliminating the
compositional survey but calling for a year-round ascertainment process. Ascertain-
ment of Community Problems by Commercial Broadcast Applicants, 57 F.C.C.2d
418 (1976). The community leader checklist included nineteen enumerated
categories:
(1) Agriculture; (2) Business; (3) Charities; (4) Civic, Neighborhood
and Fraternal Organizations; (5) Consumer Services; (6) Culture; (7)
Education; (8) Environment; (9) Government (local, county, state &
federal); (10) Labor; (11) Military; (12) Minority and ethnic groups;
(13) Organizations of and for the Elderly; (14) Organizations of and for
Women; (15) Organizations of and for Youth (including children) and
Students; (16) Professions; (17) Public Safety, Health and Welfare;
(18) Recreation; and (19) Religion.
Id. 442. The checklist also included an "other" category, to be used at the broad-
casters discretion. Id.
33 Ascertainment of Community Problems by Noncommercial Educational
Broadcasters, 58 F.C.C.2d 526 (1976).
34Deregulation of Radio, 84 F.C.C.2d 968 (1981).
5 Revision of Programming Policies and Reporting Requirements Related to
Public Broadcasting Licensees, 46 Fed. Reg. 43,190 (1981).
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can be discussed, broadcasters have never been expected to address
all concerns, but are free to respond to the community's problems
as they see fit.33 The courts and the Commission have often dis-
agreed on the relative weights of different problems, but there is
complete agreement that broadcaster discretion is paramount.
37
Even before beginning deregulation of the communications
industry, the Commission did not expect broadcaster response to
each problem. Its oversight role was limited to "expect[ing], and
. .. requir[ing] .... broadcasters to be responsive to the issues facing
their community." 38 The breadth of this requirement that broad-
casters address "community problems" led women and minorities
to argue that the media pays inadequate attention to their needs.3 9
As the petitions to deny license renewal in Gottfried indicate,
the hearing-impaired hold similar views.
2. FCC Response to the Problems of the Deaf
The history of the FCC's relationship with the deaf is short
and relatively uneventful. Its most notable feature is the Com-
mission's insistence that television broadcasters remember the
needs and problems of the deaf. The FCC's first notice broaching
the subject, The Use of Telecasts to Inform and Alert Viewers
with Impaired Hearing,40 was "merely advisory" and placed no
3625. Question: Must an applicant plan broadcast matter to meet all
community problems disclosed by [its] consultations?
Answer: Not necessarily. However, [it] is expected to determine in good
faith which of such problems merit treatment by the station. In deter-
mining what kind of broadcast matter should be presented to meet those
problems, the applicant may consider [its] program format and the com-
position of [its] audience, but bearing in mind that many problems affect
and are pertinent to diverse groups of people.
Primer, 27 F.C.C.2d at 685.
37 See Stone v. FCC, 466 F.2d 316, 328 (D.C. Cir. 1972) ("[A broadcaster]
may not flatly ignore a strongly expressed need; on the other hand, there is no
requirement that a station devote twenty percent of its broadcast time to meet the
need expressed by twenty percent of its viewing public"); Broadcast License Re-
newals Act: Hearings on S. 16, S. 247, S. 272, S. 613, S. 646, S. 822, S. 844, S. 849,
S. 851, S. 1311, S. 1589, S. 1870, S. 3637, and H.R. 12993 Before the Subcomm.
on Communications of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 104
(1974) ("A strongly expressed problem or need may not be ignored; however,
there is no requirement that a licensee apportion a specific amount of broadcast
time to each of the groups and elements that comprise its service area") (statement
of Richard E. Wiley, FCC Chairperson).
38 Deregulation of Radio, 84 F.C.C.2d 968, 978 (1981).
2 See National Organization for Women v. FCC, 555 F.2d 1002 (D.C. Cir.
1977); Stone v. FCC, 466 F.2d 316 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
4026 F.C.C.2d 917 (1970). The report suggested that broadcasters caption
emergency announcements to alert the hearing-impaired and to emphasize the im-
portance of the message. It also made general statements about television's poten-
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affirmative requirements on broadcasters. It did, however, 'sug-
gest that broadcasters in multistation markets consider offering
programming for the deaf on a rotating basis.
41
The Commission said nothing more on the subject until late
1975, when it proposed regulations requiring broadcasters to trans-
mit emergency messages both aurally and visually.42 Regulations
were adopted in late 1976,43 but language in the proposed regula-
tions asking viewers to inform their hearing-impaired friends of
the emergency message was deleted in the adopted version. 44 The
Commission withdrew the proposal because it agreed with com-
ments that the sentence might cause "needless concern and anxiety"
and discourage broadcasters from transmitting the emergency
messages.
45
Commission efforts in nonemergency areas have had even less
positive results. The most important action concerned the Public
Broadcasting Service's attempt to reserve a segment of the broad-
cast signal-line 21 of the vertical blanking interval-solely for
the use of closed captions.46  In its proposal, the Commission re-
quested comments addressing the possible negative effects of total
reservation of line 21 on future technical development and ex-
ploitation of data transmission capabilities.47  After reviewing
the comments, the Commission concluded that there were too
many unanswered questions to warrant total reservation.
48 It
tial value to the deaf, and warned that broadcasters should take steps to improve
service in order to avoid FCC rulemaking setting minimum requirements.
41Id. 918.
42 Amendment of Part 73 of the Commission's Rules to Establish Requirements
for Captioning of Emergency Messages on Television, 57 F.C.C.2d 99 (1975).
4 3 Amendment of Part 73 of the Rules to Establish Requirements for Captioning
of Emergency Messages on Television, 61 F.C.C.2d 18 (1976).
44 Id. 21. See Amendment of Part 73 of the Commission's Rules to Establish
Requirements for Captioning of Emergency Messages on Television, 57 F.C.C.2d
at 104.
45 61 F.C.C.2d at 20.
4 6 See Amendment of Subpart E, Part 73, of the Commission's Rules and
Regulations, to Reserve Line 21 of the Vertical Blanking Interval of the Television
Broadcast Signal for Captioning for the Deaf, 57 F.C.C.2d 1013 (1976) (proposed
rulemaking); 63 F.C.C.2d 378 (1976) (report and order). "Closed captioning"
is visible only on television sets equipped with special decoding devices. The
Public Broadcasting Service and Sears, Roebuck & Co. have cooperated in develop-
ing such a device. Reconsideration, supra note 17, at 281.
47 57 F.C.C.2d at 1016.
48 63 F.C.C.2d at 388. Public broadcasters' comments supported total reserva-
tion of line 21. But industry representatives argued that the cost of captioning
was excessive, that line 21 could be put to better use, that the size of the hearing-
impaired audience (estimated by the Public Broadcasting Service at 14 million
persons) would be approximately 1.8 million viewers, and that alternatives such
as amplification devices would be more efficient Id. 381-87.
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therefore amended the rules governing line 21 to permit-but not
require-closed captioning, and to make individual licensees re-
sponsible for determining how best to meet the needs of their
hearing-impaired viewers.49 In a separate statement, Commissioner
Joseph Fogarty expressed concern that response to the Commission's
"six-year-old policy statement" encouraging broadcaster service to
the deaf was "disappointing." He lauded the Public Broadcasting
Service's efforts as "the only exception to this sad observation." 10
Advocates for the hearing-impaired would certainly share the
view that little has been done for their constituents in the ascer-
tainment and programming areas.51 In response to the petition
to deny license renewal filed by Sue Gottfried, the Commission
noted that broadcasters were under no obligation to actively seek
out leaders of the handicapped, 2 and that there was no require-
ment that broadcasters utilize special programming techniques
such as captioning.53  Once again, though, the Commission called
upon broadcasters to provide some service for the deaf, but in
comparison with its 1970 statement,54 its tone was mild.i5
In denying reconsideration of Mrs. Gottfried's "petitions to
deny," the Commission again stated that rulemaking might be
necessary "at a later date" if the closed captioning program was
unsuccessful.56  Finally, the Commission specifically rejected an
attempt to include a "handicapped" category in its community
leader checklist, stating that the handicapped would fall into the
"other" category and would be interviewed only if they contacted
a broadcaster and the broadcaster determined that they were a
"significant" portion of the community.5 7
49Id. 389.
SO Id. 392.
51 PBS and two commercial networks are currently cooperating to provide up
to twenty hours per week of captioned programming. Gottfried, 655 F.2d at 303
& n.18.
52 See Renewal Applications, supra note 17, at 456.
53 Id. 458.
54 See upra note 40 and accompanying text.
G5 "[W]e urge all television licensees to review the options presently available
that, within reason, might provide some of the benefits of the medium of television
for this nation's hearing impaired." Renewal Applications, supra note 17, at 459
(emphasis added).
56 Reconsideration, supra note 17, at 281.
57Amendment of the Primers on Ascertainment of Community Problems by
Commercial Broadcast Renewal Applicants and Noncommercial Educational Broad-
cast Applicants, Permittees and Licensees, 76 F.C.C.2d 401, 418 (1980). See
supra note 33.
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In short, the Commission has addressed the needs and prob-
lems of the hearing-impaired largely by relying on licensee inita-
tive. Public broadcasters as a group have taken the lead in pro-
viding television service to the hearing-impaired; commercial
broadcasters have responded with somewhat less enthusiasm, al-
though two networks provide up to twenty prime-time hours of
close-captioned programming per week. 8  Nevertheless, the Com-
mission, while encouraging these efforts, has taken no steps to re-
quire broadcasters to serve the needs of the hearing-impaired.
C. The Judicial Role
The FCC, as an expert agency, has performed most of the
substantive work in defining the public interest. But because the
Communications Act 59 provides for judicial review of agency de-
terminations, the courts have a significant oversight role.
Judicial review is typically granted after the Commission has
declined to hold a hearing, as it did in Gottfried.60 The Com-
munications Act requires the Commission to conduct an evidenti-
ary hearing whenever a "substantial and material question of fact
is presented [by a petition to deny] or the Commission for any
reason is unable to make the [public interest] finding." 61 But
like the public interest standard, the "substantial and material"
requirement evades definition. The legislative history of the 1960
Communications Act amendments stated that the purpose of the
"substantial and material" language was to
make it absolutely clear that the application will be desig-
nated for a hearing before a grant in any case where a
substantial and material question of fact is presented and
not disposed of. For the purpose of sections 309 (d) and
(e) a "material question of fact" is a question of fact
which is material to determination of the question
5 8 See Gottfried, 655 F.2d at 303 & n.18.
5947 U.S.C. §402(b)(6) (1976). See 5 U.S.C. §§702, 706 (1976) (Admin-
istrative Procedure Act). Section 702 provides for judicial review of agency action
by persons aggrieved by that action, and § 706 provides the standards of judicial
review.
60 The appeal to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
stemmed from the Commission's refusal to schedule a hearing at which the peti-
tioners could more fully state the reasons for their contention that the stations'
licenses should not be renewed. See generally Renewal Applications, supra note
17; Reconsideration, supra note 17. Courts have required a hearing when a petition
to deny makes "substantial and specific allegations of fact which, if true, would
indicate that a grant of the application would be prima facie inconsistent with the
public interest." Stone v. FCC, 466 F.2d 316, 322 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
6147 U.S.C. §309(e) (1976).
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whether the public interest, convenience, or necessity
would be served by the granting of the application with
respect to which such question is raised.
62
In essence, the Commission is left to determine what meets
the "substantial and material" criterion, and the courts review
that decision. In general terms, the courts' role is limited by the
principle that they may not substitute their judgment about what
is in the public interest for that of the agency,63 and may reverse
only if the agency's action is "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." 64
Once the FCC defines the public interest, however, the courts
have a greater role. Then it is the duty of the reviewing judges
to determine whether a substantial and material question of fact
is actually raised by the petitions that the agency has acted upon.
This requires the court, accepting the agency's determination of
the boundaries of the public interest,65 to determine whether on
the facts set forth in the petition the Commission could reasonably
have found that no material or substantial factual question whether
the licensee had acted in the public interest was raised.
This was the court's position in Office of Communication of
the United Church of Christ v. FCC.66 In United Church of
62 H.R. REP. No. 1800, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1960), reprinted in 1960
U.S. CoDE CoNG. & A. NEws 3516, 3520.6 3 The Court most recently articulated this principle in FCC v. WNCN
Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 382 (1981), in sustaining an FCC policy of permitting
market forces to promote diversity in radio entertainment formats. See also FCC
v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 426 U.S. 775 (1978) (upholding
FCC ban on common ownership of newspaper and broadcast station in the same
community).
645 U.S.C. §706(2)(A) (1976). For examples of recent applications of the
arbitrary and capricious standard, see CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 101 S. Ct. 2813 (1981)
(access requirement); Anniston Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 668 F.2d 829 (5th Cir.
1982) (per curiam) (refusal to waive divestiture rules); Stereo Broadcasters, Inc.
v. FCC, 652 F.2d 1026 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (license transfer policy); Cosmopolitan
Broadcasting Corp. v. FCC, 581 F.2d 917 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (delegation of pro-
gramming to "time brokers"). See generally Note, Perfecting the Partnership:
Structuring the Judicial Control of Administrative Determinations of Questions of
Law, 31 VAND. L. REv. 91 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Perfecting the Partnership].
65 In the past, courts were usually asked to approve or disapprove the Com-
mission's independent efforts to expand the public interest requirement. See, e.g.,
NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943). In that case the Court upheld the
Commission's right to promulgate regulations concerning licensing, network control,
and so forth. The Court also held that the FCC could consider antitrust policies
in determining what action would serve the public interest.
NBC rejected the view that the FCC was merely a "traffic cop" controlling
use of the airwaves. Id. 215-16. It is interesting to note, however, that recently
appointed FCC members seem to favor the "traffic cop" role. See Deregulation
of Radio, 84 F.C.C.2d 968 (1981); Revision of Programming Policies and Reporting
Requirements Related to Public Broadcasting Licensees, 46 Fed. Reg. 43,190 (1981).
66 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
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Christ, individual members and the congregation of a United
Church of Christ in the Jackson, Mississippi area presented the
Commission a "petition to deny" a local television station's renewal
application based chiefly on the grounds of racial and religious
discrimination in the station's programming.6 7 The Commission
denied the "petition to deny" without a hearing and granted con-
ditional renewal of the license for one year. Writing for the
District of Columbia Circuit, Judge Warren Burger reversed the
Commission, holding that under the circumstances alleged by the
petition, a renewal hearing was required to resolve the public
interest issue.68
The court held that a history of misconduct of the kind set
forth in the petition would, under FCC decisions, preclude the
Commission as a matter of law from making the public interest
finding.6 9 It rejected the Commission's argument that the im-
portance of having a station in Jackson overrode the violations,
commenting that the FCC's "'policy' decision is not the result of
some long standing or accepted proposition but represents an ad
hoc determination in the context of Jackson's contemporary prob-
lem .... [I]t is a determination valid in the abstract but calling
for explanation in its application." 'o
Thus, United Church of Christ established two propositions.
First, the court held that "[p]ublic participation is especially im-
portant in a renewal proceeding . . . [unlike] the case when the
Commission considers an initial grant .... .71 Second, the court
made it clear that, once the FCC defines the parameters of the
public interest, it cannot then ignore its own definition. The
courts stand ready to ensure, on behalf of the public, that the
Commission's determination of what meets the public interest stand-
ard in particular cases is consistent with its formulation of the
public interest standard in the abstract.72
The D.C. Circuit followed the United Church of Christ court's
reasoning in National Organization for Women v. FCC.73 In that
67Id. 998-99. The petitioners also alleged that the station had violated the
fairness doctrine, see supra note 5, and that the station's programming "provided
a disproportionate amount of commercials and entertainment." 359 F.2d at 998.
68 Id. 1006-07.
69 Id. 1007.
70 Id. 1008.
71 Id. 1004.
72 Id. 1008.
73555 F.2d 1002 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
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case the FCC declined to hold a hearing on a license renewal
application despite the petitioner's claim that the licensee had
violated the FCC's own guidelines on nondiscrimination in em-
ployment practices. The court upheld the issuance of the regula-
tions under the public interest standard, and ordered a hearing to
determine whether the allegations were true. Thus, the court
again demonstrated its willingness to enforce the FCC's determina-
tion of the boundaries of the public interest by requiring the
Commission to follow its own regulations74
The D.C. Circuit greatly expanded the United Church of
Christ doctrine when it began to require hearings in entertainment
"format" cases. The Commission had held that the public inter-
est was best served by allowing radio stations to change their
entertainment formats at will, permitting market forces to de-
termine the kinds of programming available.
In a series of cases culminating in Citizens Committee to Save
WEFM v. FCC,75 however, the D.C. Circuit began requiring hear-
ings when a proposed format change coincided with a license
renewal or transfer. The court articulated as the basis for its hold-
ing a concern that a significant part of the listening public be able
to receive the format of its choice. Thus, if no substitute were
74 That the Commission has the power to adopt regulations requiring broad-
casters to take affirmative steps on behalf of the hearing-impaired is hardly open
to doubt. The Supreme Court explicitly noted the breadth of the FCC's power to
protect minority interests under the public interest standard in NAACP v. Federal
Power Comm'n., 425 U.S. 662 (1976). That case involved an attempt to require
the FPC to impose equal employment opportunity and nondiscrimination in em-
ployment requirements on its regulatees under its statutory "public interest" mandate.
See id. 666 & n.4.
The Supreme Court held that the "public interest" standards guiding the FPC
and the FCC were different. Specifically, the Court stated:
The use of the words "public interest" in the Gas and Power Acts is not
a directive to the Commission to seek to eradicate discrimination, but,
rather, is a charge to promote the orderly production of plentiful supplies
of electric energy and natural gas at just and reasonable rates.*
*The Federal Communications Commission has adopted regulations
dealing with the employment practices of its regulatees. These regu-
lations can be justified as necessary to enable the FCC to satisfy its
obligation under the Communications Act of 1934 to ensure that its
licensees' programming fairly reflects the tastes and viewpoints of
minority groups. It has nowhere been argued that the Federal Power
Commission needs similar regulations to promote energy production
at reasonable rates.
Id. 670 & n.7 (citations omitted).
75506 F.2d 246 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (en bane). See Citizens Comm. to Keep
Progressive Rock v. FCC, 478 F.2d 926 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Citizens Comm. to
Preserve the Voice of the Arts in Atlanta v. FCC, 436 F.2d 263 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
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available in the listening area, the court held that the public in-
terest might require that the station retain its format.7"
The Commission responded with a policy statement announc-
ing that a change in entertainment programming would not be
considered a material factor by the Commission in passing upon
license renewals and transfers. The FCC stated its conclusion
that market forces were the best determinants of broadcasting
formats, and that the Communications Act did not require hear-
ings to determine whether format changes were in the public in-
terest.77 The policy statement specifically asked the D.C. Circuit
to reconsider its decision in Citizens Committee to Save WEFM.78
The en banc D.C. Circuit adhered to its decision in Citizens
Committee to Save WEFM, declaring the FCC's policy statement
"to be unavailing and of no force and effect." 71 The court
reasoned that its position on format hearings
76 WEFM, 506 F.2d at 262. In Progressive Rock, the court of appeals went
so far as to warn the Commission that its public interest determinations might be
subject to judicial review. The court stated that "[f]ailure to render a reasoned
decision will be, as always, reversible error." 478 F.2d at 934, quoted in FCC v.
WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. at 587 n.8.
Perhaps the most extreme example of judicial intrusion occurred in Consolidated
Edison Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 512 F.2d 1332 (D.C. Cir. 1975). In that
case the court of appeals temporarily implemented a plan previously rejected by
the agency. One commentator observed that the case
presented not a clash over alternative policies but one over the agency's
limitations in effecting a particular policy. The Court undoubtedly will
uphold a permanent plan . . . when the Conmission's final decision . . .
is rendered. But it will be a plan formulated and implemented in a
manner approved by the Court. A prolonged, highly charged dispute
turned not on a conflict of political or economic ideologies but . . . on
the differing institutional perspectives of court and agency.
Fiorino, Judicial-Administrative Interaction in Regulatory Policy Making: The Case
of the Federal Power Commission, 28 AiUMs. L. REv. 41, 75 (1976).
77 See WNCN, 450 U.S. at 588; see also Development of Policy Re: Changes
in the Entertainment Formats of Broadcast Stations, 60 F.C.C.2d at 861 (Memo-
randum Opinion and Order); 57 F.C.C.2d at 583 (Notice of Inquiry).
78 610 F.2d at 841. The Commission requested that the court reconsider the
decision because of the "partnership" between the agency and the court of appeals.
The Commission stated: "when such 'partners' come to a point of fundamental
disagreement, it is incumbent upon us to take a step back and rethink our entire
position if this relationship is to be creative rather than destructive." Id. 845
(quoting Development of Policy Re: Changes in the Entertainment Formats of
Broadcast Stations (Memorandum Opinion and Order), 60 F.C.C.2d 858, 865
(1976)).
One commentator suggests that this idea of a court-agency partnership suffers
from a series of conflicts stemming from courts' and agencies' differing policy
objectives, bases of expertise, and definitions of problems. The agencies are oriented
toward policy goals and seek to develop expertise in particular areas, leading to the
development of perspectives on regulatory problems different from the perspectives
of the courts. For example, in many situations an agency must be concerned with
immediate action and implementation of some plan, yet courts would be concerned
with private rights and procedural rules. See Fiorino, supra note 76.
79 WNCN, 610 F.2d at 858.
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represents, not a policy, but rather the law of the land as
enacted by Congress and interpreted by the Court of
Appeals, and as it is to be administered by the Commis-
sion. This Court has neither the expertise nor the con-
stitutional authority to make "policy" as that word is
commonly understood. That role is reserved to the
Congress, and, within the bounds of delegated authority,
to the Commission. But in matters of interpreting the
"law" the final say is constitutionally committed to the
judiciary.8 0
The court likened its decision in the format cases to United Church
of Christ, holding that both were statutory interpretations.8'
Judge Bazelon's concurring opinion seized on the majority's
distinction between "law" and "policy." He stated that "imple-
menting the public interest standard calls for a strong dose of
policy judgment, a responsibility entrusted by Congress to the
FCC. Yet the majority virtually confines the FCC to a spectator's
role in formulating policies that will promote and preserve di-
versity .... ," 82 Judge Tamm's dissent sounded the same theme,
stating:
The majority has lost sight of our role as a reviewing
court whose proper function is to uphold an agency's rea-
sonable judgment. The Commission's determination that
the use of the [format] doctrine will not further the pub-
lic interest is well within the parameters of reason. Faced
with a conflict between judicial and administrative pol-
80id. 854-55 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). The contrary argu-
ment is persuasively advanced by one student commentator.
The arguments supporting de novo review of legal matters are based on
the language of the APA and the constitutional role of the courts as the
ultimate arbiters of legal interpretation. Professor Jaffee's characterization
of these arguments as "unsound" is apt. By delegating its lawmaking
powers, the legislature has established the agencies as the decision makers
in the first instance. Thus, to preserve the constitutional integrity of both
the legislature and the agency, the delegate's role should be viewed as
similar to that of the delegating authority, and agency determinations of
law should be accorded some deference similar to that granted agency
findings of fact. . . . Like the power exercised by the legislature, the
lawmaking power delegated to the agencies could be considered as com-
mitted to the discretion of the decision maker and therefore largely immune
from judicial review.
Perfecting the Partnership, supra note 64, at 123 (footnotes omitted).
81 Id. 855 (citing WEFM); id. 857 (citing United Church of Christ).
82 Id. 858-59 (Bazelon, J., concurring) (footuote omitted).
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icies, I believe that we are obliged to uphold the Commis-
sion's decision.83
The D.C. Circuit's decisions in the format cases effectively
held that a court could override an agency's interpretation of its
governing statute based on the court's view of that statute's mean-
ing. Despite the Commission's explicit decision that the public
interest was best served by letting market forces determine pro-
gramming format, the court of appeals reinterpreted the public
interest standard to reflect its own views.
This practice of interpreting an agency's statute de novo-
despite a contrary interpretation from the agency-seemed peculiar
in light of principles of administrative law.84  In Red Lion Broad-
83Id. 865 (Tamm, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted). Judge Tamm added
the observation that the format decisions were based on neither law nor policy, but
a mixture of both. Id. n.19. This view is supported by the authors of a recent
defense of agencies, who state:
For example, when directed by Congress to arrive at judgments that will
serve "the public convenience, interest or necessity" or to set rates that
are "just and reasonable," an agency is not expected to derive the meaning
of its mandate from the language and the legislative history of a statute.
The agency is expected, instead, to draw upon its practical experience to
develop new meanings of these phrases as time passes.
Woodward & Levin, In Defense of Deference: Judicial Review of Agency Action,
31 AD. L. REv. 329, 339 (1979) (footnotes omitted). Another commentator
expressed agreement by proposing that:
Beyond those areas that constitute the agency's ambit of expertise the
courts are "comparatively the experts" in interpreting statutes other than
the agency's enabling statute, constitutional doctrine, judge-made law, and
legal philosophy. In these areas in which discretion has not been dele-
gated to the agency, the court is not merely a supervisory partner but a
co-equal decision maker. The court can abandon the abuse of discretion
analysis in reviewing those parts of the agency's determination that stray
beyond the area of the agency's acknowledged expertise and defer to the
agency's judgment in reviewing the remainder.
Perfecting the Partnership, supra note 64, at 129 (emphasis added) (footnote
omitted).
84 "Courts reviewing administrative action frequently begin their analysis of a
disputed question of construction by assuming that the agency's interpretation is
correct and then inquiring whether other factors outweigh the agency's view."
Woodward & Levin, supra note 83, at 332. The widely-held view is that the
justifications for this approach are the agency's familiarity with and sophistication
regarding the statute it administers. For example, an agency's day-to-day admin-
istration of its governing statute reveals the practical consequences of one inter-
pretation instead of another.
Factors leading courts to hold the presumption of agency correctness rebutted
include congressional activity relating to the administrative construction, disagree-
ment among agencies, lack of need for technical expertise in interpreting the statute,
and so forth. See generally Mid-Louisiana Gas Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory
Comm'n, 664 F.2d 530, 534 (5th Cir. 1981).
With respect to the format case situation, however, the Supreme Court seemed
to express itself quite clearly in NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111
(1944). The Court stated:
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casting Co. v. FCC,85 the Supreme Court held that "the construc-
tion of a statute by those charged with its execution should be
followed unless there are compelling indications that it is wrong,
especially when Congress has refused to alter the administrative
construction." 86 In CBS, Inc. v. FCC,7 the Court reaffirmed the
Red Lion rule with the observation that "[s]uch deference 'is par-
ticularly appropriate where, as here, an agency's interpretation
involves issues of considerable public controversy, and Congress
has not acted to correct any misperception of its statutory
objectives.' "88
The Supreme Court resolved the conflict between the D.C.
Circuit's format rule and the Red Lion rule of deference in FCC
v. WNCN Listeners Guild.8 9 The Court reversed the court of
appeals, reinstating the FCC's format change policy statement and
holding that the Commission's public interest decisions were to
be accorded "substantial judicial deference." 90 The Court stated:
The Commission's implementation of the public-interest
standard, when based on a rational weighing of competing
policies, is not to be set aside by the Court of Appeals,
for "the weighing of policies under the 'public interest'
standard is a task that Congress has delegated to the
Commission in the first instance." 91
The Court thus announced that the judiciary must avoid
entering the public interest field unless the Commission has failed
to act reasonably in fulfilling its statutory obligation.9 2  WNCN
Where the question is one of specific application of a broad statutory term
in a proceeding in which the agency administering the statute must deter-
mine it initially, the reviewing court's function is limited. . .. [T]he
[agency's] determination . . . is to be accepted if it has "warrant in the
record" and a reasonable basis in law.
Id. 131.
85395 U.S. 367 (1969).
86Id. 381 (footnotes omitted).
87 101 S. Ct. 2813 (1981).
88Id. 2823 (quoting United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 554 (1979)).
See Mid-Louisiana Gas Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 664 F.2d at
534; cases cited in supra note 64.
89450 U.S. 582 (1981).
90 Id. 596.
91 Id. (quoting FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S.
775, 810 (1978)).
92See Malrite T.V. v. FCC, 652 F.2d 1140, 1149 (2d Cir. 1981) ("The
Commission offered a rational explanation for its policy founded on a predictive
judgment well within its authority. See FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild").
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would appear to put sharp limits on the kind of review of public
interest determinations undertaken by the Gottfried court.
But there is no lack of authority for the proposition that
courts can require agencies to expand the scope of statutory in-
terpretations. In Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin,9 3 the Court
rejected the Federal Power Commission's narrow interpretation
of its governing statute, significantly expanding the Commission's
jurisdiction. The Court explicitly rejected the Commission's argu-
ment that its finding "ha[d] a reasonable basis in law and [was]
supported by substantial evidence of record and therefore should
be accepted by the courts, particularly since the Commission ha[d]
'consistently' interpreted the Act as not conferring jurisdiction
. . " It stated simply that it was of the opinion "that the
finding was without an adequate basis in law ....
The deference question may also be complicated by the kind
of agency action that a court is reviewing. The argument in favor
of judicial deference is strongest when the informational nature
of the proceedings, including notice and comment by interested
parties, makes it likely that the agency's decision is based on a
"thorough exploration of the relevant issues." 90 But in a case
93 347 U.S. 672 (1954). See also Office Employees Int'l Union v. NLRB, 353
U.S. 313, 318 (1957); Kingsbrook Jewish Medical Center v. Richardson, 486 F.2d
663, 670 (2d Cir. 1973); Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159, 1163 (D.C. Cir.
1973) (en banc) (per curiam).
94347 U.S. at 677-78.
95 Id. 678. The confusion in this area is aptly demonstrated in recent Supreme
Court cases. For example, in Northeast Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U.S.
249, 272-73 (1977), the Court unanimously refused to adopt the statutory inter-
pretation advanced by the Director of the Office of Workers' Compensation Pro-
grams. Yet in that same term, the Court reprimanded the Eighth Circuit for
substituting its judgment about the construction of a statute for that of the SEC.
E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Collins, 432 U.S. 46 (1977). The Court
accused the court of appeals of "all but ignoring the congressional limitations on
judicial review of agency action," id. 55, and of "clearly depart[ing] from its
statutory appellate function" in overturning "agency conclusions of law ...based
on a construction of the statute consistent with legislative intent." Id. 57. In
that case the SEC was applying the "reasonable and fair" standard of section 17
of the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17 (1976).
This confusion continues to reign. In Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444
U.S. 555 (1980), the Court stated that it would defer to an agency staff inter-
pretation unless that interpretation is "irrational." Id. 568. And in Immigration
& Naturalization Service v. Wang, 450 U.S. 139, 144 (1981) (per curiam), the
Court summarily reversed a decision by the Ninth Circuit for "improvidently
encroach[ing]" on the agency's determination of the meaning of "extreme hardship."
But in Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 262-63 (1981), the Court overturned a
statutory interpretation concurred in by the Department of the Interior and the
Comptroller General. See generally K. DAvis, Ar nrrarsRA=nv LAw TPAx-TSE
§30.02 (Supp. 1982).
96 Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 506 F.2d 33, 39 (D.C.
Cir. 1974).
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like Gottfried, in which the agency's decision is merely a refusal
to act,
[j]udicial review may be the first stage at which the policy
is subjected to full criticism by interested parties. Con-
sequently a policy judgment expressed as a general state-
ment of policy is entitled to less deference than a decision
expressed as a rule or an adjudicative order. Although
the agency's expertise and experience cannot be ignored,
the reviewing court has some leeway to assess the under-
lying wisdom of the policy and need not affirm a general
statement of policy that merely satisfies the test of reason-
ableness.9 7
WNCN and Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin0 8may have
sounded the death knell for this reasoning, for the former in-
volved judicial review of a policy statement and the latter review
of an agency staff interpretation. In each case the Supreme Court
firmly reiterated the need for deference.
Indeed, the Court has shown no inclination to recognize a
line between agency action that has been subjected to public com-
ment and that which has not.99 The Court granted certiorari in
Gottfried specifically to address the deference question. Based on
the decisions in the line of cases from Red Lion to WNCN, it is
likely that the Court will conclude that the court of appeals acted
improperly in substituting its reading of the Communications
Act for the FCC's interpretation. Hopefully, the Court will take
the opportunity to resolve some of the confusion about the def-
erence question by clarifying the extent to which the judgment
of reviewing courts is relevant in interpreting the statutory com-
mands governing administrative agencies.
971d. 40 (footnote omitted).
98 444 U.S. 555 (1980). See supra note 95.
99 See supra note 95. The question of overlapping agency jurisdiction is beyond
the scope of this Comment. The reader is referred to a very few decisions of the
courts of appeals considering the issue. See Board of Trade v. SEC, FED. SE:c.
L. REP. (CCH) f98,605 (7th Cir. Mar. 24, 1982); SEC v. American Commodity
Exchange, Inc., 546 F.2d 1361, 1367-68 (10th Cir. 1976); see also Section of
Administrative Law 1976 Bicentennial Institute, Oversight and Review of Agency
Decisionmaking, 28 AD. L. BEv. 569, 626 (1976) ("Idea competition between the
[Department of Transportation and the ICC] gave Congress in [consideration of
national transportation policy] a much better perspective on the issues involved")
(remarks of ICC Commissioner A. Daniel O'Neal). Cf. Ford Motor Credit Co.,
444 U.S. at 566 (particular deference due to agency Congress designates to
interpret and apply law).
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III. THE COMMERCIAL-NONCOMMERCIAL DISTINcrION
Part II of this Comment demonstrated that recent Supreme
Court decisions and settled administrative law principles suggest
that the D.C. Circuit lacked the authority to command the FCC
to consider the needs of hearing-impaired viewers in license re-
newals. In the event that analysis proves incorrect, this Part con-
siders whether the court of appeals' substantive holding in Gottfried
v. FCC 100 is justifiable.
In requiring that the Commission inquire into noncommer-
cial broadcasters' efforts to serve the hearing-impaired, the Gott-
fried court focused primarily on the strictures imposed on re-
cipients of federal funds by section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act. o10 The court determined that because commercial broad-
casters did not receive federal funds directly, they were beyond the
reach of section 504. The court did state, though that the Commis-
sion, in its discretion under the public interest standard, could
require commercial broadcasters to act affirmatively in order to ex-
tend service to hearing-impaired viewers.10 2 In view of the FCC's
history of inaction on the problems of the hearing-impaired, 103 the
court's reliance on the Commission's discretion amounts to pre-
serving the status quo.
Leaving aside the question whether commercial broadcasters
receive federal funds or aid, subjecting them to the dictates of
section 504,1.04 the court could have used the public interest stand-
ard to apply the same requirements to commercial broadcasters
as it applied to their noncommercial counterparts. The court
"recognize[d] that the Commission's statutory obligation to pursue
the public interest requires it to protect the interests of the hard
of hearing in having meaningful access to commercial broadcast-
ing." 105 The court also stated that the benefits of both commercial
and noncommercial television "should be made available to persons
with impaired hearing now." 106 The court did not articulate the
100 655 F.2d 297 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 998 (1982).
10129 U.S.C. § 794 (1976 & Supp. IH 1979).
102 Gottfried, 655 F.2d at 314-15.
10 3 See supra notes 40-57 and accompanying text.
10 4 Ms. Gottfried argued that FCC conferral of broadcast licenses should be
viewed as "federal financial assistance" within the meaning of § 504. See Appel-
lants' Opening Brief at 27-39; Appellants' Reply Brief at 4-9, Gottfried v. FCC,
655 F.2d 297 (D.C. Cir. 1981). The Supreme Court declined to review this
contention. 102 S. Ct. 1004 (1982) (denial of certiorari).
10- Gottfried, 655 F.2d at 301.
o6 Id. 306.
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reasoning supporting its dual public interest standard, but it was
probably concerned about the limitations imposed on its ability
to second-guess agency policy judgments imposed by the Supreme
Court's decision in FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild.0 7 Although,
as Part II of this Comment demonstrates, some concern on that
score was justified, the court's decision to incorporate the provi-
sions of section 504 into the public interest doctrine made it il-
logical to limit the holding to public broadcasters.
The court concluded that its authority was limited by the
"federal financial assistance" provisions of section 504.101 Never-
theless, the federal assistance limitation goes to Congress's power
to reach purely private conduct, and does nor suggest that national
policy permits or encourages discrimination against the handi-
capped by private entities. The use of section 504 to limit the
government's power, under the sweeping public interest standard,
to prevent discrimination against the handicapped reveals the
government's reluctance to press for a truly nondiscriminatory
national policy.
Other FCC and court decisions indicate that the once-frequently
drawn distinction between commercial and noncommercial broad-
casters has been abandoned. For example, the Commission initi-
ally exempted noncommercial broadcast license applicants from
ascertainment requirements because "[g]iven the reservation of
channels for specialized kinds of programming, educational sta-
tions manifestly must be treated differently than commercial sta-
tions." 109 In 1976, however, the Commission subjected most non-
commercial applicants 110 to the same ascertainmenlt requirements
as commercial applicants,"' including filing a demographic survey
and using a Community Leaders Checklist. Subsequent changes
in ascertainment requirements apply without distinction to com-
mercial and noncommercial broadcasters." 2
107 450 U.S. 382 (1981). See supra notes 75-92 and accompanying text.
108 655 F.2d at 312-14.
10 9 Primer on Ascertainment of Community Problems by Broadcast Applicants,
27 F.C.C.2d at 651.
" 0 Ascertainment of Community Problems by Noncommercial Educational
Broadcast Applicants, 58 F.C.C.2d 526 (1976).
Ill Ascertainment of Community Problems by Broadcast Applicants, 53 F.C.C.2d
3 (1976). See supra note 32.
112 See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
In addition to ascertainment requirements, other Commission policies apply to
commercial and noncommercial broadcasters alike. The equal employment oppor-
tunity requirement, for example, applies to all broadcasters with ten or more
employees. See Nondiscrimination in the Employment Policies and Practices of
Broadcast Licensees, 60 F.C.C.2d 226, 235 (1976). Similarly, political candidates'
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The D.C. Circuit upheld the FCC's public interest oversight
of noncommercial licensees in Accuracy in Media, Inc. v. FCC. 113
The court stated that the Commission could enforce the fairness
doctrine and other components of the public interest standard
against individual noncommercial broadcasters, just as it could
against commercial licensees."14 This decision suggests by implica-
tion that the Commission could likewise impose components of
the public interest standard applicable to noncommercial licensees
on commercial broadcasters.
The Gottfried court, in looking to the policy underlying
section 504, actually expanded the definition of "the public in-
terest," not merely the duties of particular broadcasters affected by
section 504. Limiting the decision's reach to public broadcasters is
flatly inconsistent with the principle that every licensee must serve
the public interest. This should be so regardless of whether the
licensee derives its revenues from the federal government or from
commercial advertising. "The public interest" should encompass
and effectuate substantive national policies; it should not be limited
by the narrow reach of statutes announcing those policies.
IV. CONCLUSION
With respect to principles of administrative law, the decision
in Gottfried v. FCC "5 has mixed implications. The decision
means that, for the moment, judicial review of the FCC's interpre-
tation of the public interest standard will continue. But the Su-
preme Court's decision in FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild 116
indicates the Supreme Court's dissatisfaction with judicial re-in-
terpretation of that standard, and with agency statutory interpreta-
tions in general. In light of WNCN, the court of appeals in
Gottfried may have gone too far.
With respect to the rights of the hearing-impaired, however,
the court may not have gone far enough. For them, Gottfried
right of access to broadcast facilities, see 47 U.S.C. §312(a)(7) (1976), extends
to both public and private broadcasters. Senator James L. Buckley, 63 F.C.C.2d
952 (1976).
13 521 F.2d 288 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 934 (1976).
114"We find nothing in [47 U.S.C.] § 398 which limits established FCC
authority, including the Fairness Doctrine, over local noncommercial licensees."
521 F.2d at 295 (footnote omitted). Although it held that the Commission could
enforce the public interest standard against individual noncommercial broadcasters,
the court upheld the FCC's decision to refuse jurisdiction over the Corporation for
Public Broadcasting.
115 655 F.2d 297 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 998 (1982).
116 450 U.S. 582 (1981).
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will probably have little effect. The FCC will have to consider
noncommercial broadcaster response to the problems of the deaf
in license renewals but because public broadcasters lead the in-
dustry in service and programming for the hearing-impaired, the
Commission will almost certainly find individual station response
to be adequate. The court's greatest opportunity for constructive
change was in the commercial broadcasting industry, where re-
sponse to the needs of the hearing-impaired has been minimal.
But the court's decision to rely on Commission discretion in that
area, given the FCC's past record, bodes poorly for increased
attention to the needs of the hearing-impaired.
